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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation:  Study on the implementation of Formal Safety Assessment for 
the development of the mandatory Polar Code 
Degree:     MSc 
 
The dissertation carries out a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for the development of the mandatory code for ships 
navigating in polar water (“the Polar Code”). The risk-based Polar Code is developed 
with functional requirements and supporting prescriptive regulations in order to ensure 
the safe navigation and environmental protection in polar waters, which is comparatively 
more environmentally vulnerable. 
The key process during the development of the Polar Code is presented adopting 
the independent environmental protection part. A historical review of the Polar Code 
will be summarized from the adoption of the Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic 
ice-covered water in 2002 to the Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters in 2009, 
which is a basis for the further study. 
The current achievement of FSA will be reviewed and the new direction of research 
of FSA will be discussed according to the research and opinions of experts. The 
framework and limitations of FSA will also be illustrated to point out challenges to carry 
out the FSA.  
The recommendation of FSA for the Polar Code will be discussed through the 
preparatory stage and further FSA stages. The limitations, advantages and disadvantages 
will be carefully analyzed and discussed.  Feasible and practical solutions and options 
will be provided based on the analysis.  
 As a part of the conclusion, recommendations for future work relating to the 
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environmental part of the Polar Code will be provided to IMO, international 
organizations and member states.   
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Polar Code, FSA, environmental protection, Arctic waters, 
environmental risk evaluation criteria, environmental risk acceptance criteria 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background  
Trends and forecasts indicate that polar shipping will grow in volume and diversify 
in the coming years and these challenges need to be met without compromising 
either safety of life at sea or the sustainability of the polar environment. 
The Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment has been tasked with 
coordinating the drafting work, and reporting to the Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC) and Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). 
The move to develop a mandatory Polar Code follows the adoption of the 
recommendatory Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters (Resolution A.1024 
(26)) by IMO’s MSC and MEPC committees separately. The main purpose of the 
Guidelines is to address those additional provisions deemed necessary for 
consideration beyond existing requirements of the SOLAS and MARPOL 
Conventions. The specific climatic conditions of polar waters, the safety as well as 
environmental protection are all considered by the working group.  
Considering the mandatory Polar Code, it aims at providing a risk-based code with 
proactively functional requirements and supporting prescriptive regulations for safety 
and environmental protection concerns. The drafting work is conducted by DE with 
support from member states and other interested stakeholders such as NGOs and 
classification societies.  
The mandatory Polar Code is intended to function alongside existing IMO 
conventions, such as SOLAS and MARPOL. One of its functions is to augment 
“baseline” environmental protection of polar waters to reflect their increased 
environmental sensitivity. If certain specific locations within polar waters need 
further protection this will be provided by existing mechanisms separate from the 
Polar Code. 
12	  
Meanwhile, the formal safety assessment has been described as "a rational and 
systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activity and for 
evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO's options for reducing these risks"(MSC 
91/16). It can be used as a tool to help evaluate new regulations or to compare 
proposed changes with existing standards. 
The Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making 
process were approved in 2002 and amended in 2006. The formal safety assessment 
involves much more scientific aspects than previous conventions. The benefits of 
adopting formal safety assessment as a regulatory tool include the following (Marine 
Safety Agency, 1993): 
l A consistent regulatory regime that addresses all aspects of safety in an 
integrated way; 
l Cost effectiveness, whereby safety investment is targeted to where it will 
achieve the greatest benefit; 
l A proactive approach enabling hazards that have not yet given rise to accidents 
to be properly considered; 
l Confidence that regulatory requirements are in proportion to the severity of the 
risks; 
l A rational basis for addressing new risks posed by ever-changing marine 
technology. 
Until now, the FSA is still the state of art for rule-making process and the topic has 
moved from safety issues to environmental issues.  Discussion on appropriate 
environmental risk criteria is still underway and a working group was established in 
2013 in order to finish the job as soon as possible.  
 Increasing vessel traffic in polar waters indicates an expected increase in accidents 
and incidents, which are major contributors to marine pollution. The mandatory 
Polar Code is the only document under development for these specific areas. The 
environmental protection part needs to be developed and finished according to the 
schedule; therefore, it is urgent and essential to consider the application of FSA into 
the rule-making process of the Code.  
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1.2.  Objectives and methodology of research 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to identify the challenges of the FSA 
studies for the Polar Code focusing on the environmental protection issues, according 
to an analysis of the preparatory work and the 5 steps of FSA separately. Possible 
and practical solutions and methods will be recommended by the author accordingly. 
Moreover, recommendations and suggestions for future works will be concluded 
according to the results of the study. The subsequent purpose of this dissertation is to 
give a general review of the development of FSA and the polar code. The tendency 
of recent research and new topics under discussion will be also introduced and 
discussed.  
The dissertation will commence from a historical review of IMO’s Polar Code and 
illustrate all related International regulations and IMO instruments in order to clarify 
the current regulatory regime for the polar waters. The environmental protection part 
will be highlighted by the author for further discussion. Based on an analysis of the 
framework of FSA, potential problems, limitations and disadvantages of current FSA 
will be identified and assessed, taking into consideration the recent research and 
opinions of experts. The new topic of establishing environmental risk evaluation 
criteria will be also be discussed briefly. Then the necessity of implementing the 
FSA for the Polar Code concerning environmental protection could be confirmed 
according to the aforementioned issues and the challenges for the preparatory work 
and each FSA step will be analyzed according to an investigation into working 
reports including AMSA 2009 report, IAATO report and HAZID workshop report.  
Then the potential choices of solutions to carry out an appropriate FSA can be 
approached. By comparing and analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of those 
potential choices, feasible recommendations will be concluded accordingly.  
1.3. Organization of dissertation 
To	   start	   with,	   chapter	   1	   will	   provide	   an	   introduction	   and	   background	   to	   the	  research,	   the	   objectives	   and	   methodology	   as	   well	   as	   the	   organization	   of	   the	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dissertation.	   	  
In the second chapter, the development of the IMO Polar Code will be introduced by 
a historical review. The present and forthcoming conventions and regulations 
published not only by IMO but also by related organizations will be discussed. The 
study achievements by experts will be reviewed as a basis for further study. 
In the third part, the background and development as well as the current 
achievements and new topics of FSA will be introduced and analyzed. The major 
framework and limitations of FSA will be carefully analyzed. The environmental 
issues as a global trend will be concluded for further discussion. 
In chapter 4, the preparatory work of FSA for the polar will be analyzed according to 
the status of historical data. The possibility and priority for the future FSA will be 
analyzed and discussed with differences between two polar waters as well as the 
necessity and feasibility of safety risks and environmental risks.   
Chapter 5 will focus on the detailed FSA steps. The HAZID will be analyzed 
referring to the HAZID workshop report. During the process of analyzing, qualitative 
methods and the quantitative methods will be illustrated with key factors. After 
pointing out the challenges of FSA, possible and more feasible methods and options 
will be provided accordingly. 
In the last chapter, all findings and outcomes of the study will be concluded. 
Moreover, recommendations for future work will be provided for IMO and interested 
stakeholders of the Polar Code to develop the environmental sector. 
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2.   The IMO Polar Code 
2.1. Historical review of the development of regulations for polar waters by 
IMO 
From 1996, in order to harmonize those rules and regulations pertaining to Polar 
Regions, The Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) has been tasked 
with coordinating the work of developing a strong Polar Code for the ice-covered 
waters. The results of the working group have been reported to the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) and Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) for 
further discussion. 
However, the progress of the Polar Code in IMO is quite slow and complex 
considering the nature of polar waters.  According to the data of IMO document DE 
41/10,1997 (Development of a Polar Code —The International Code of Safety for 
Ships in Polar Waters), the Polar Code was originally drafted by an outside working 
group of technical experts in neutral words assigned by IMO from different 
administrators and classification societies. The main purpose of this draft is to 
harmonize the different legal regimes within those areas for future shipping 
requirements.  
From then on, this draft of the Polar Code, covering Arctic and Antarctic waters, was 
thoroughly discussed by IMO. After an extensive exchange of views and options 
from different countries and related organizations, considering the different nature of 
the two polar waters as well as the problem of application scope, DE transferred its 
Polar Code framework into a recommendatory guideline for ships navigating in 
Arctic ice-covered waters after MSC 71 in 1999. 
Later on, the Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters were 
approved by MSC and MEPC separately in 2002 by an MSC/MEPC joint circular 
(MSC/Circ.1056 – MEPC/Circ.399) as an addition to the mandatory and 
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recommendatory provisions existing in IMO instruments.  
However, The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-ninth session in 2004, 
received a submission from South Africa on behalf of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties (MSC 79/8/2 (Secretariat)). Considering the increasing level of 
shipping, especially in the tourist areas, ATCM invited IMO to amend the guidelines 
for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters so as to also be applicable to ships 
navigating in ice-covered waters within the Antarctic Treaty Area. They believed 
that the IMO’s membership had far more States than those states under the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
Therefore, a modification of the guidelines for compatibility with the Antarctic was 
proposed and open for comments from other countries and related organizations.  
Technical requirements relating to double bottom construction as well as the 
replacement of “Arctic and Antarctic” in the title of the Guidelines was proposed by 
ATCM. Moreover, the DE Sub-Committee noted that more attention should be paid 
to passenger ships that only visited the Polar Regions (DE 50/27, 2007).  
As a result, IMO also adopted the Guidelines on Voyage Planning for passenger 
ships operating in remote areas in 2007 (A 25/Res.999) especially for passenger 
ships operating in remote areas in order to prevent incidents of groundings and 
collisions. 
From further discussion on the development of the Guidelines by the Working Group, 
they recognized that “ice-coverage is not the only challenge when sailing in Polar 
waters” (DE 52/WP.2, 2009) and decided to change the “ice-covered waters” of the 
title into “polar waters”. However, the word “Guidelines” was kept for the 
recommendatory nature of the provisions of this document. Finally, Guidelines for 
ships operating in Polar Waters was adopted by IMO Assembly on 2 December 2009 
Resolution A.1024 (26).  
After consulting opinions and proposals from different countries and organizations, 
the Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters was adopted by IMO Assembly on 
2 December 2009 ((Resolution A.1024 (26)).  
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However, even before the adoption of the Guidelines, the further move to develop a 
mandatory code for polar areas was proposed by some NGO members such as FOEI, 
Greenpeace and WWF during the DE 53rd session in 2009. From their report 
submitted to DE Sub-Committee (MSC 86/23/19, 2009), the urgency of developing a 
mandatory code for polar waters was described according to records of accidents that 
happened in the Southern Ocean from 2008 to 2009 and the ship-born tourist 
activities in Antarctica as well as the increasing number of ships operating in the 
Arctic and the accidents that have happened over the last decade. A rapid ratification 
and full implementation including compensation and liability instruments was 
encouraged by these organizations.  
Meanwhile, a proposed framework of the Code was submitted by Canada during DE 
53rd session. The document DE/10 of 1997 was repeated again as it was written in 
neutral language and still sufficient in scope to work as a mandatory provision. 
When it came to discussion of a mandatory code for Polar Regions, for the first time, 
a risk-based approach in determining the scope was proposed by Germany (DE 
54/13/1) wherein the provisions of the code would be supported by the overall goals 
and functional requirements for ships operating in polar waters in order to mitigate 
identified risks to acceptable levels and minimize the consequences of identified 
risks.  
From 2011 to 2013, discussions between various countries and organizations have 
focused on issues such as boundaries of the polar region and environmental aspects. 
During this period of time, more attention was paid by the maritime field to polar 
risk assessment and establishing a risk basis for the Polar Code in order to develop a 
powerful mandatory Polar Code.   
  
2.2. Present and forthcoming conventions, regulations and proposals published 
by IMO and other Organizations for polar waters 
Over the last 20 years, IMO as well as other related organizations and countries have 
developed a lot of regulations, guidelines and recommendations regarding the polar 
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waters.  
In this section, the major existing legal framework before and after the development 
of a mandatory Polar Code will be illustrated and discussed in detail.  
  
2.2.1. UNCLOS and Antarctic Environmental Protocol 
UNCLOS is a legal framework governing the rights and responsibilities of nations in 
their use of ocean space. The convention was concluded in 1982 and came into force 
in 1994. As of August 2013, 166 countries including the European Union have 
ratified the Convention.   
According to section 8, Article 234 (Ice-covered areas): 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from 
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, 
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to 
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations 
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
This is the only Article of UNCLOS that has a direct influence in the polar waters 
and allows coastal states of polar waters to pass and enforce rules on pollution within 
their exclusive economic zones in order to solve the problem of foreign shipping 
traffic. However, the definition of “ice-covered area” mentioned in this article was 
not clearly clarified in UNCLOS. Therefore, a lot of discussions and arguments have 
been raised and it has not yet been agreed upon and fully applied in Polar Regions.  
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty is one of the most 
important additions to the Antarctic Treaty System and provides for comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems. 
This protocol including 27 articles and 6 Annexes was concluded in 1991 and 
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entered into force on January 14, 1998. Until now, 33 parties have joined and ratified 
this protocol. Although this protocol is not able to regulate all kinds of activities of 
vessels operating in both Polar waters, it provides a good foundation for the 
environmental protection part of the Polar Code.  
However, these regional groupings of states commonly have jurisdiction over 
vessel-borne pollution within their capacities as flag or port states, for instance, 
Annex IV, named “Prevention of Marine Pollution of the Environmental Protocol to 
the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
2.2.2. IMO instruments 
As Article 234 of UNCLOS mentioned above only provides a general jurisdictional 
framework regarding vessel-borne pollution for ice-covered areas, those IMO 
instruments have played an important role in the further operational stage. 
Considering difficulties in complying with those various requirements among 
regional States with navigation and discharge standards, IMO instruments have long 
been involved in harmonizing these requirements for the overall interests in 
international shipping. Those major conventions including SOLAS, MAROL 73/78 
and STCW will be illustrated briefly in this section.  
The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is regarded as the 
most important international treaty considering the safety of ships and provides 
minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships. 
The provisions relating to the ice-covered areas can be found in Chapter V, 
navigation requirements. Referring to Regulation 5, Meteorological services and 
warnings, it says that weather information suitable for shipping shall be collected and 
analyzed including the ice data. Regulation 6, Ice Patrol Services, requires ships 
transiting the region of icebergs guarded by the Ice Patrol during the ice season to 
make use of the services provided by the Ice Patrol. Moreover, Regulation 31, 
Danger message, and Regulation 32, Information Required in Danger message, 
regulate masters to communicate information on dangers to navigation including 
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dangerous ice and its specification.  
In 2008, IMO adopted the International Code on Intact Stability, 2008 (2008 IS Code) 
and it entered into force on 1 July 2010. The provisions of part A of the IS Code are 
mandatory under the 1974 SOLAS Convention and the 1988 Load Lines Protocol 
while Part B is recommendatory (Resolution MSC.267(85)). According to Part B, 
Chapter 6, Icing consideration, those ships operating in ice-accretion areas are likely 
to experience adverse effects on the ship’s stability, so icing allowance should be 
included during the analysis of the loading condition. 
MARPOL 73/78 is the main convention regulating the prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment from vessel-source pollution with discharge and emission 
standards developed by IMO. Besides the six Annexes with general requirements for 
the ships navigating at sea, MARPOL73/78 also provides stricter standards for a 
higher level of protection for the “special areas” and more stringent discharge 
standards for the “SOx Emission Control Areas.”  
However, the Antarctic area has been designated as a special area under Annex I, 
Prevention of pollution by oil, Annex II, control of discharge of residues of noxious 
liquid substances, and Annex V, Disposal of garbage, while no part of the Arctic 
marine area has been designated yet. Moreover, in the Antarctic area new chapter 9 
of MARPOL Annex I, establishing a ban on the use and carriage of heavy grade oils, 
entered into force on 1 August 2011.  
Regarding oil response in ice and snow condition, a new guidance on oil spill 
response in ice and snow conditions is still under development by MEPC. 
As human factors have been a hot topic over the last decade, a training guidance for 
personnel on ships operating in polar waters has also been discussed and developed 
during this period. 
The newly adopted guidance stresses the importance for officers in charge of a 
navigational/engineering watch on board ships operating in polar waters to have 
sufficient and appropriate experience with polar waters. There are measures to ensure 
the competency of masters and officers of ships operating in polar waters and also 
recommend that Governments adopt measures to ensure that masters and officers of 
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ships operating in polar waters have appropriate training and experience. 
 
2.2.3. Guidelines and recommendations 
Considering the specific nature of polar waters, IMO has developed several useful 
guidelines for ships navigating in those areas as follows:  
Guidance for passenger ships operating in areas remote from SAR facilities 
(MSC.1/Circ.1184) enhanced planning arrangements for ships operating in remote 
areas, including close cooperation and liaison with relevant RCCs in 2006. 
Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas 
(A.999(25)) adopted on 29 November 2007. This Guidelines provide additions to 
voyage and passage plan, such as details on ice and ice formations, ice navigators, 
operational limitations due to ice, safe distance to icebergs, and carriage of special or 
enhanced equipment. 
Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters (A.1024 (26)), adopted by the 26th 
IMO Assembly in 2009.  Currently, this is the most comprehensive Guidelines 
regarding polar waters and provide a holistic approach for navigational safety in 
polar waters and also work as a basis for the development of the mandatory Polar 
Code. The details of the contents and structures of the Guidelines will be discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
 
2.3. Study and research achievement of mandatory Polar Code made by 
working group (DE) of IMO  
As the author mentioned in the first Chapter, the decision to develop a mandatory 
Polar code was first proposed in the 1990s, but the idea was not accepted by a lot of 
countries and then the recommendatory guideline was adopted by IMO. However, 
just before the guideline was adopted, the proposal for developing a mandatory Polar 
Code came back to the table for discussion and was approved by IMO. The DE 
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Sub-committee was again designated as the coordinator and a working group was 
organized accordingly for this. 
According to DE 53/18, 2009, the outcome of the 32nd Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting (ATCM XXXII) adopted a resolution on a mandatory shipping code for 
vessels operating in Antarctic waters (Resolution 8 (2009)). As requested by the 
meeting, the Chair of ATCM XXXII corresponded with IMO in this regard and the 
text of the resolution was attached for the information of the Sub-Committee. 
At the same time, during the period of MSC 86, countries like Argentina, Chile, 
Norway, and the United States as well as other related organizations submitted 
proposals for new mandatory work on the basis of the guidelines. 
From DE53, the working group started to work with this topic. The DE 
sub-committee provided a justification for a new work program item “Development 
of a Code for ships operating in Polar waters”. During the DE sessions, a 
correspondence group was established to work intersessionally. (DE 53/26).  
During this meeting, most of the members agreed on the development of a risk based 
Code with functional requirements supported by prescriptive provisions with both 
mandatory and recommendatory parts (DE 53/26).  
Later on, the discussion of the Polar Code in DE 54 moved to the environmental 
aspects and DE agreed to utilize a risk-based approach. Therefore, a correspondence 
group to review a hazard matrix was developed to identify the hazards. Meanwhile, a 
workshop on the environmental aspects of the Polar Code was held in Cambridge 
from 27-30 November 2011. The report of this workshop was focused on the Hazard 
identification of ships navigating in polar waters. 
In 2011, DE55 continued working on the development of a mandatory Code for ships 
operating in polar waters, which covered the full range of shipping related matters in 
waters surrounding the two poles. More technical parts of the draft code w developed 
and discussed, taking into account the outcome of other bodies meeting in the interim 
including MEPC and NAV.  
In 2012, DE56 continued to work with the draft and agreed with the group’s 
recommendation to forward relevant sections to the sub-committees on 
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Radiocommunications, Search and Rescue (COMSAR); Fire Protection (FP); Safety 
of Navigation (NAV); Stability, Load Lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF); and 
Training and Watchkeeping (STW) for their review and input.  
In relation to environmental aspects of the Code, the Sub-Committee noted that the 
working group had been divided as to whether the environmental protection 
provisions should be elaborated as a part of the Code, or as amendments to the 
relevant annexes of MARPOL and other appropriate IMO instruments, and decided 
to keep any decision on environmental requirements to be included in the Code in 
abeyance pending further consideration by the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC). The Sub-committee also agreed to urge the MEPC and the 
MSC to prioritize the discussion on how to make the Polar Code mandatory at their 
forthcoming meetings. 
At DE57 of 2013, The Sub-Committee made significant progress in further 
developing the draft mandatory International Code of safety for ships operating in 
polar waters (Polar Code), in particular with the finalization of a draft chapter on 
environmental protection for consideration by MEPC 65, and requested the MSC to 
authorize the holding of an intersessional meeting of the Polar Code Working Group 
in late 2013, to further progress the work. 
According to the draft of the Code, the aim is to finalize the draft Code in 2014 for 
adoption by the MSC and Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). The 
Polar Code is intended to cover the full range of shipping-related matters relevant to 
navigation in waters surrounding the two poles – ship design, construction and 
equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally 
important, the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar 
regions. 
Agreement in principle was reached on definitions for the different categories of ship 
to be covered by the Code, as follows: 
Category A means a ship capable of operating at least in medium first-year ice which 
may include old ice inclusions in accordance with an ice class at least equivalent to 
those acceptable to the Organization. 
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Category B means a ship capable of operating in sea ice conditions other than those 
included in Category A with an ice class at least equivalent to those acceptable to the 
Organization. 
Category C means any ship which is not a Category A or Category B ship. 
It was agreed that that all ships operating in polar waters should have a Polar Ship 
Certificate and a Polar Water Operation Manual. 
As instructed by the main committees, it was agreed that the Polar Code would be 
adopted by separate MSC and MEPC resolutions, with amendments to mandatory 
instruments to be developed to make the Code mandatory.  This would also impact 
on the structuring of the Code. 
The Polar Code correspondence group was re-established to further develop the draft 
Code and also draft amendments to mandatory IMO instruments (SOLAS and 
MARPOL), to make the Code mandatory. 
In addition to DE, from 2010, there has been some revision of international 
conventions, considering the situation of polar waters, for instance, MARPOL 
convention Chapter 9, Annex I added a new Regulation 43 for using of heavy grade 
oil, which entered into force on 1st August 2011. 
 
2.4. Challenges in the development of a mandatory Polar Code  
Developing a mandatory Polar Code has been widely discussed over last decade in 
the IMO and there have been great achievements, which were mentioned in last 
section. 
The challenges that the mandatory Polar Code meets with are mostly decided by the 
structure of the Polar Code adopted by DE as well as by the specific nature of polar 
waters.  
Proactive environmental protection for both poles is intended to “avoid an Exxon 
Valdez or Concordia-type disaster in polar waters before real regulatory action is 
achieved in these vulnerable regions,” said John Katenstaein of Friends of the Earth. 
Considering the nature of polar waters, topics such as geographical limitations, scope 
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of ships involved, ship categories and differences between the two polar waters have 
been discussed and agreement has almost been arrived at, as  can be found in the 
recent report of the working group and the current draft of the Polar code.  
During DE 54 sessions, the utilization of a risk-based/goal-based approach, as 
proposed by Germany (DE 54/13/1), had been adopted and the recent Polar Code 
with goals and functional requirements supported by prescriptive provisions has been 
provided by the working group for further discussion in DE 56.  
This risk-based approach gives not only a sufficient flexibility for alternative designs 
and arrangements but also major challenges for further development of the Polar 
Code, especially in the environmental protection aspects. 
As there will be a special chapter for environmental protection in the Polar Code, the 
biggest challenges will include but not be limited to: 
l How to identify and rank all the possible risks? 
l How to set the level of need for additional environmental risks? 
l How to mitigate the environmental risks? 
Therefore, in this dissertation, the author would like to recommend the Formal Safety 
Assessment, which is a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks 
relating to maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment and for 
evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO’s options for reducing these risks 
(MSC/Circ.1023, 5th April 2002), to work as a tool to provide support and further 
suggestions for the future IMO decision-making process for the Polar Code. 
 
2.5. Summary 
 Global climate change is now providing new opportunities for international 
transportation in polar waters.  
According to the speech given by Sekimizu, the secretary-general of IMO, at the 
opening of the 53rd session of the DE sub-committee:  
The recent developments are opening the way for the North Pole region to be 
used by international navigation, and rendering its vast resources easier to 
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access, makes it all the more important for us to take action to ensure not 
only the safety of ships passing through but also that any exploration and 
production activities taking place therein are conducted in a manner that will 
have no negative impact on the environment. (DE 53/INF.7) 
Therefore, although the working group on the Polar Code, with support from various 
international organizations, has made great achievements in developing a mandatory 
Polar Code, more academic studies and discussions relating to environmental risks 
for ship navigating in polar waters shall be continuously carried out by IMO.  
The formal safety assessment is complicated with a few limitations; however, 
compared to other novel methods, it is still a reliable method recommended by IMO 
for the rule-making process.  
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3. The Formal Safety Assessment recommended by IMO 
3.1. Background and development of IMO Guidelines for FSA 
The concept of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) was developed in the 1990’s after a 
series of ship accidents happened, especially involving bulk carriers. Therefore, in 
1993, the UK Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) submitted a document about a new 
approach to marine safety involving risk assessment and benefit assessment 
techniques for IMO’s rule making process for shipping. This was the basis for the 
future development of FSA in IMO. 
During MSC 62nd session in 1993, the proposal of the UK was accepted and a 
corresponding group in-between was established accordingly. After two years, a 
seminar on FSA was held at IMO headquarters and the FSA concept was strongly 
supported by member governments to be used in future IMO rule-making process. 
Meanwhile, MSC decided to establish a working group for the development of 
Guidelines for the application of FSA. 
During further discussion within the working group, the MEPC committee was also 
invited to be involved in the development of the Guidelines in order to address 
environmental protection issues. Later on, the “interim Guidelines for the 
Application of Formal Safety Assessment to the IMO Rule-Making Process” 
(MSC/cir.829, MEPC/cir.335) was approved separately by MSC and MEPC in 1997. 
After the MSC 68 session, more input from active participants as the result of trial 
applications were provided by several member states of IMO and at the MSC 69 
session, the committee agreed to “expand the FSA interim guidelines in order to 
clarify the incorporation of the HE and to consider the mechanism by which they 
could be used within the IMO rule-making process.” 
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Finally, the Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8 
June 2001), and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, at its forty-seventh 
session (4 to 8 March 2002), approved: 
1  Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making 
process (MSC/Circ.1023-MEPC/Circ.392); and  
2  Guidance on the use of Human Element Analysing Process (HEAP) and Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) in the IMO rule-making process 
(MSC/Circ.1022-MEPC/Circ.391).  
This was the sign of the official adoption of the FSA by IMO and further 
implementation work is still under discussion in IMO. Therefore, during the 
seventy-fifth session of the Maritime Safety Committee, there were various studies 
on bulk carrier safety submitted by different countries with different 
recommendations.  
However, after a joint MSC/MEPC working group on the human element was 
established in MSC 78, the MEPC committee decided to establish a correspondence 
group on FSA matters under the coordination of Japan. 
Later, The MSC committee decided to establish a correspondence group to review 
the Guidelines and prepare draft amendments and also established a working group 
to consider the need for a group of experts on FSA.  
According to MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.5, the committee approved AMENDMENTS TO 
THE GUIDELINES FOR FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FSA) FOR USE IN 
THE IMO RULE-MAKING PROCESS (MSC/Circ.1023 - MEPC/Circ.392) in 2006. 
During MSC’s 84th Session in 2008, the Committee agreed, in general, to establish 
an FSA Expert Group. From then on, the topic of Environmental Risk Evaluation 
Criteria became a hot topic and a corresponding group coordinated by Greece was 
established for this topic. Meanwhile a review of FSA studies submitted by 
SAFEDOR was conducted by FSA experts of IMO. As a result, in 2011, MEPC 62 
considered and approved the report of its Working Group on Environmental Risk 
Evaluation Criteria within the context of FSA (MEPC62/WP.13). The revised 
guidelines for FSA was reviewed and approved at the MSC 91(2012) and MEPC 65 
29	  
(2013) separately and the environmental risk evaluation criteria were included in the 
Annex of the Guideline. (MSC-MEPC.2/CIRC.12, 2012) 
 
3.2. The recent achievement and application of FSA in the shipping industry 
The first application of the FSA Guidelines happened after the adoption of the 
“Interim Guidelines” (IMO 1997) and at that time the FSA was named “Trial 
Applications”. The first reports were submitted by the UK with the title “FSA on 
High Speed Craft (HSC) in 1997. However, these reports were extremely criticized 
because of the Regulatory Impact Diagram (RID) adopted as a risk model. Although 
these reports were not accepted for the rule-making process, they contributed to the 
future amendment of the FSA Guidelines. 
Another important case of FSA for Helicopter landing Area (HLA) on Cruise ships 
was carried out following the Estonia Accident (Estonia 1997). This FSA/HLA was 
carried out by DNV (Skjong et al., 1997) and later submitted to IMO for review. This 
is the first case including a benefits and costs assessment in which IMO took the 
recommendations from the FSA reports into consideration for the rule-making 
process.    
The unforgettable case in FSA history in IMO shall be the Bulk Carrier Double Hull 
case. The FSA on bulk carrier safety was proposed by the UK in 1998. After that, 
different countries such as Norway, UK and Japan as well as some organizations like 
IACS and INTERCARGO separately submitted their FSA reports and 
recommendations to IMO. Moreover, there was an international study coordinated by 
the UK from 1999 and related progress reports and recommendations were submitted 
accordingly.  
During MSC71 (IMO, 1999) to MSC 76 (December 2002), the discussion between 
countries was focus on the risk control options and the quantification period of costs 
and benefits assessment. Many recommendations including double side skin for bulk 
carriers were submitted to IMO through FSA reports. After reviewing  all of the 
FSAs, IMO agreed to implement double side skin for bulk carriers larger than 150 
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meters at MSC 76. 
However, after accepting a review document of FSA with the title “Comparative 
Study of Single and Double Side Skin Bulk Carriers” (Greece, 2004) by Greece, the 
issue of mandating double side skin bulk carriers was taken back to the table of IMO 
for discussion and debate. After a voting process, this issue was abandoned by IMO 
in MSC 78 session. Considering the immediate change of decision, there was a lot of 
criticism on this action and many people considered it a failure of FSA application in 
IMO’s rule-making process under a kind of political pressure.  
Another recent successful case of FSA study in IMO is the mandatory carriage 
requirement for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS). This 
study was submitted by DNV under support of Denmark and Norway (MSC 
81/INF.9) in 2006 and a Bayesian Network model was adopted as a modeling 
technique. According to the final report of the FSA on ECDIS (MSC81/24/5), it says 
the ECDIS, as cost-effective equipment, should be mandatory for most  ships, 
excluding only smaller vessels.  
As a result, an amendment to SOLAS Chapter 5 about ECDIS entered into force for 
passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 
2012 and tankers of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 
2012. Other sizes of ships and types will be required to carry ECDIS in the years to 
come.  
A large project of Design, Operation and Regulation for Safety (SAFEDOR) 
sponsored by the European Commission is also a recent great achievement of FSA. 
The project started in 2005 and closed in 2009 with several FSA reports on different 
kinds of ships and a book titled “Risk Based Ship Design”. The list of the FSA 
reports with related hazard identification reports submitted by SAFEFOR are listed 
as follows: 
l FSA LNG Carriers (MSC 83/INF.3, 2007) 
l FSA container vessels (MSC 83/INF.8, 2007)  
l FSA crude oil tankers (MEPC 58/INF.2, 2008) 
l FSA Cruse ships (MSC 85/INF.2, 2008) 
31	  
l FSA RoPax ships (MSC 85/INF.3, 2008) 
l FSA dangerous goods (MSC87/INF.2, 2009) 
The main purpose of this project was to improve maritime safety through the 
integration of safety into design and also to enhance the competiveness of maritime 
industry by a proposal for a modern regulatory framework and new ship designs. 
(page 3, SAFEDOR 2006).  
In the final report of this project, the mandatory review for new and major revisions 
of instruments of IMO with acceptable criteria (page 47, SAFEDOR 2009) as well as 
accident reporting and underreporting issues were also recommended by the working 
group. It means that the FSA is still state of art for IMO’s rule-making process and 
more works for the Guidelines need to be done by the Organization. 
After the SAFEDOR project, other than the revision of FSA guidelines, recent FSA- 
related activity within the IMO has moved on two parallel fronts. (Kontovas, 2009). 
The first one was the review of the FSA studies submitted by SAFEDOR as well as 
other countries and organizations by FSA experts and the second one was working 
with environmental risk evaluation criteria, which focuses on oil pollution (Kontovas, 
2009).  
Therefore, from 2009 until now, Japan is leading the group of experts to work on the 
environmental risk evaluation criteria and, meanwhile, IACS and Germany continue 
to work on FSA studies on topics such as safety of general cargo ship (MSC 
88/INF.8, 2010) and stowage of water-reactive materials (DSC 16/INF.2, 2011). In 
2012, during the MEPC 62, the committee established a working group on 
environmental risk evaluation criteria to finalize the step 4 cost-benefit assessment of 
FSA with an appropriate volume-dependent CATS global threshold scale (MEPC 
62/24).  
 
3.3. Framework and Limitations of FSA 
According to the Guidelines of FSA (MSC/MEPC.2/Circ.12), the framework of an 
FSA study could be divided into five steps as follows: 
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Step 1: Identification of hazards; 
Step 2: Risk analysis; 
Step 3: Risk control options; 
Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment; and  
Step 5: Recommendations for decision-making. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the 5 steps as well as the preparatory work 
that shall be done beforehand.  
 
 
Figure 1. Flow chart of FSA (IACS, MSC75-5) 
 
The Figure 1 of IMO shows the linkage between 5 steps throughout the FSA study.  
The weak linkage between step 1 and step 2 as well as step 1 and step 3 is always 
mentioned in the report of review of the FSA study and will be discussed later.  
During the preparatory period of FSA, the definition of the problem shall be clearly 
illustrated referring to those types of ships and regulations that need to be reviewed. 
The boundary of the study is usually to be narrowed for further assessment and 
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application. If the scope of the FSA study is too large, it may take more time to 
complete the final report and also is difficult for others to review as well as further 
implement.  
For the first step, all potential hazardous scenarios shall be identified and ranked 
accordingly. It has been noticed that most FSA studies have used historical data from 
different databases of marine casualties. However, FSA study is a proactive method 
for rule making.  A list of hazards identified only from historical data could not be 
used for discussions about adding new measures to reduce risk because sufficient 
data for these accidents needs to be collected beforehand.  
Another big limitation of using historical data is the reliability and transparency of 
the database. A great number of warnings and “near misses” were not included in the 
database and those important potential hazards could not be identified at the first 
stage. In the report of SAFEDOR (SAFEDOR, 2009), the underreporting issues were 
mentioned and Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) was strongly 
recommended at that time.  
When it comes to ranking the identified hazards, a risk matrix (Table 3) based on the 
severity index and frequency index (see Table 1, Table 2) can be adopted according 
to the annex of FSA Guidelines (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12) 
 
 
Table1: Severity Index 
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Table 2: Frequency Index 
 
Table 3: Risk matrix based on above Severity and Frequency index 
 
Although this risk matrix will not be used for decision-making, this is an important 
tool that IMO provides for experts during the hazard identification step. However, 
the limitation of this two-dimensional table has been discussed because it 
overemphasizes frequent, low-consequence events over extremely rare accidents that 
are really catastrophic (Kontovas, 2005). Moreover, during the hazard identification 
step, a suitable expert group shall be carefully selected and the concordance matrix 
included in FSA Guidelines shall be carried out after the ranking of hazards.  
According to FSA Guidelines, step 3, Risk control options, shall find out areas 
needing control and risk control measure (RCM) accordingly. Meanwhile, the 
effectiveness of RCM in risk reduction shall be evaluated by re-evaluating step 2. At 
last, RCMs shall be grouped into risk control options for decision-makers. However, 
this step, which strongly relies on the experts’ subjective opinions, will be a problem 
35	  
for the future decision-making period. What’s more, the interrelationship between 
different RCMs always raises questions during the review process and needs to be 
clarified in the report.  
The cost benefit analysis (CBA) is obviously an important step and also a difficult 
and complicated one. Referring to the RCOs identified in step3, the benefits and 
costs shall be carefully compared. Currently, the Cost of Averting a Fatality (CAF) 
with the “$3m Criteria” is commonly adopted in FSA studies. As an outcome of step 
4, the identification of cost effectiveness shall be expressed by suitable indices such 
as Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (GCAF) and Net Cost of Averting a Fatality 
(NCAF).  
However, in this quantitative model, only the expected number of fatalities is 
considered with a safety perspective. It means this model and criteria are not suitable 
for environmental assessment. According to the report of the SAFEDOR project 
(Skjong et al., 2005), they adopt a new CAT (Cost to Avert one tonne of spilled oil) 
criterion with a threshold value of $60,000 per tonne of spilled oil, which takes oil 
pollution into consideration in the qualitative model. However, after that numerous 
countries and organizations sent critical comments on the new CAT criterion adopted 
in FSA studies submitted by SAFEDOR, and this environmental criteria has not been 
widely accepted. 
When it comes to the last step of FSA on recommendation for decision-making, all 
other four steps need to be considered and the final recommendations shall reduce 
the risk to the “desired level” as well as being cost effective. According to the FSA 
Guidelines, both the individual and society types of risk for crews, passengers and 
third parties shall be included in the report. In order to reduce these risks to a 
“desired level”, an acceptable level of risk shall be decided and the As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle (HSE 2001) in figure 5 is often adopted 
during this process.  
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Figure 2: ALARP principle (page 48, MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12) 
 
The carrot diagram in Figure 2 shows that risk falling into the ALARP region 
shall be reduced until it is no longer reasonable to reduce the risk according to the 
result of step 4 Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). The proposed values for NCAF 
and GCAF in Table 4 can be found in ANNEX of FSA Guidelines.  
 
Table 4: Cost-effective Criteria (MSC 72/16) 
 
However, the value of indices of CEA is only provided for illustrative purpose and is 
not yet explicitly defined and, so far, the acceptable level of environmental risk is 
still under discussion.  
For the individual risk, which is person and location specific, although the risk of 
death, injury and ill heath could all be affected by a ship accident, the risk of death is 
usually taken to determine the maximally exposed individual risk. The F-N curve 
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(Figure 3) can be adopted to express the individual risk through number of fatalities 
and the cumulative frequency of year. Considering the individual risk acceptance 
criteria usually adopted in the FSA study, maximum tolerable risk for crew members 
is 10E-3 annual fatal risk and the negligible risk is 10E-6 annual fatal risk. However, 
the individual risk for crew members and passengers may be stricter.  
 
Figure 3:  Example F-N curve (espoo report 2009) 
 
According to the document submitted by Norway about risk acceptance criteria (see 
Table 5), the criteria adopted by different industries are similar with each other and 
the topic of obtaining more explicit criteria is still under discussion.  
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Table 5: Individual risk criteria in use (Skjong et al. 2002) 
 
However, the society risk is usually expressed by Potential Loss of Life (PLL) to 
quantify the risk in many FSA studies. Moreover, one method combining PLL with a 
multi-dimensional F-N diagram has been adopted currently (see Figure 4) 
(Knontovas, 2005). Both society risk and individual risk shall be adequately 
considered for a more comprehensive safety assessment according to the specific 
application field.  
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Figure 4: FN curve for passenger ro/ro ships (MSC 72/16) 
 
3.4. Global trends and future development 
The marine industry is both proactive and reactive regarding ship safety. However, 
the rule-making process of IMO is now moving from reactive to proactive and the 
formal safety assessment is still quite a useful and amateur tool for revision of 
existing regulations and development of new ones.  
A great number of achievements have been made and more and more FSA studies 
need to be finished for the further improvement of IMO regulations. Currently, a new 
amendment of FSA Guidelines with more advanced techniques has been approved 
by MSC/MEPC committee. Meanwhile, the expert group of FSA is focusing on 
reviewing those FSA studies submitted, using more complete procedures.  
As environmental protection issues became a more and more important topic in IMO, 
the corresponding group on environmental risk evaluation criteria was established in 
2008 and is still working. After the submission of the FSA studies of the SAFEDOR 
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project (Skjong et al., 2005), adoption of the criterion of Cost to Avert one Tonne of 
Spilled Oil (CAT) was widely discussed.  
The outcome of the correspondence group was added into annex 7 of the newly 
revised FSA Guidelines in 2012.  The consolidated database was developed based 
on IOPCF data, US data and Norwegian data and some regression formulae has been 
provided for further analysis. Future Guidelines for the environmental FSA have 
been recommended by the correspondence group to IMO for further discussion.  
However, so far no explicit environmental risk evaluation criterion is proposed by 
FSA guidelines. 
Thus far FSA guidelines do not stipulate how to assess environmental risk. In the 
55th session of MEPC (October 2006), however, the IMO decided to act on this 
subject. A major topic in Annex 3 of document MEPC 55/18 was the definition and 
analysis of risk evaluation criteria for accidental releases to the environment and 
specifically for releases of oil. The discussion on the environmental criteria was also 
focused on the criteria of CATS from the SAFEDOR report.  
To sum up, the future work of IMO on FSA shall be the environmental related issues 
as well as dealing with those limitations that affect the reliability of the FSA study.  
 
 
 
 
41	  
 
 
4. Preparatory work before the FSA for the development of a mandatory 
Polar Code 
4.1. Problem definition and generic model of study 
As mentioned in chapter 2, vessel traffic in both polar regions is increasing rapidly 
these years. Considering the vulnerable ecosystem of polar waters, stricter rules of 
navigation safety and environmental protection have been regulated and discussed in 
IMO. The mandatory Polar Code is definitely the most important one still under 
development.  
Historically, few accidents have occurred in the Polar waters, but zero accidents 
today does not mean that certain accidents cannot happen. The actual risk level of 
vessels navigating in polar waters has been analyzed thorough a risk model in order 
to predict the future probabilities. The accident of the Explorer sinking in the 
Southern Ocean and passenger vessel Clipper Adventure grounding in the Arctic 
area gave us good examples, illustrating that the need for a risk model is critical. It 
shows that historical accident statistics can be very deceiving especially when small 
samples are recorded in the database. 
Moreover, for ships navigating in polar waters, a major catastrophic accident could 
not only involve large numbers of fatalities but also would cause huge irreversible 
damage to the environment. Therefore, a proactive full or partial FSA study is 
essential because the tolerance for accidents in polar waters is quite low.  
As very broad FSA studies can be harder to manage (page 6, MSC 91/16), it is 
necessary to narrow the boundary of analysis beforehand and define the problem 
clearly.   
The FSA studies for ships navigating in Polar waters could be divided into several 
reports or parts by taking into account different relevant aspects such as ship 
categories, accident categories and risks associated with consequences. The functions, 
features, characteristics and attributes that are the same to all ships of the type in the 
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whole FSA study will be clearly illustrated by a Generic Model. The decision on the 
essential elements mentioned above heavily depends on investigation into the 
historical database as well as opinions from experts, and it will be discussed in the 
next chapter.   
 
4.2. Historical data collection and analysis related to ships navigating in polar 
waters 
Prior to the development of the FSA studies, a number of early studies and statistics 
are quite useful and shall be consulted. All the further risk assessments shall be based 
on a sound knowledge of the traffic density and types as well as accident categories 
as a key input.  
 
4.2.1. Geographical boundary of polar waters 
According to the current drafting of the mandatory Polar Code, the polar waters 
including both Arctic and Antarctic waters are defined separately by IMO, which can 
be indicated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Actually, the definition of polar waters in the 
Polar Code is the same one adopted in the Guidelines for ships navigating in the 
Polar Waters.  
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Figure 5: maximum extent of Arctic waters application （Guidelines for ships 
navigating in polar waters, 2011） 
 
Figure 6: Maximum extent of Antarctic Waters application （Guidelines for ships 
navigating in polar waters, 2011） 
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However, it could be easily found that the traffic in the Norwegian Sea, Iceland and 
Faroe Islands was not included in defined Arctic water, and even some vessel 
activities in US and Canadian waters are not included. When looking into the 
database of vessel traffic, for example the AMSA report, samples are quite small if 
vessels and accidents are selected according to the IMO definition of polar waters, 
especially in Arctic waters. 
A sound database with more reliable records is quite important during the 
preparatory stage of FSA studies in order to decide the scope and depth of the 
research. It can also help to correctly estimate the future tendency of vessel traffic 
and density and maximally determine the risks and hazards. 
Therefore, the geographic limitation of the FSA shall be defined according to the 
IMO adopted polar waters. However, during the preparatory historical data collection 
and analysis stage, the author strongly recommends that all “Circumpolar North 
Region” defined by Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) report shall be 
covered. The database of AMSA includes various kinds of vessels such as 
icebreakers, container ships, tankers, offshore supply vessels, ferries and coast guard 
ships (Brigham, 2010). This kind of database can provide a holistic approach for the 
experts involved with the FSA to identify more potential risks to the arctic marine 
environment as well as navigation safety.  
Moreover, considering the purpose of the FSA study, the possibilities to narrow the 
geographical scope into Arctic waters and Antarctic waters separately shall be 
further discussed considering the significant differences between the  Arctic and 
Antarctic water areas such as geographical features, types of vessel categories, as 
well as sea ice, meteorological and environmental conditions.   
Above all, the geographic scope of the FSA study for a mandatory polar code shall 
comply with the polar waters defined in it and the historical data analysis for the 
traffic and accidents could be broader and more flexible regarding the study 
purposes. 
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4.2.2. Analysis of traffic data in polar waters 
Currently, vessel traffic data can be collected from the ArcticData portal 
(www.articdata.is) of the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment Working Group 
(PAME), which is one of the six arctic council working groups. A summary of the 
total number of vessels per category per country in Figure 11 within the annual 
report of AMSA in 2009 can be adopted as a useful resource for FSA preparatory 
work. The chart below (Figure 7) shows that container ships, bulk carriers, fishing 
vessels and general cargo ships are the dominant categories of ships navigating in 
arctic waters.  
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Figure 7. Total number of vessels for each country by vessel type 
 
However, when taking these statistics into consideration, the data provided by the 
U.S. with a large number of containers and general cargo ships includes the vessels 
plying the Great Circle Routes below 60 degrees north. Therefore, according to the 
AMSA report, four categories of vessel activities were highlighted for marine use: 
community re-supply, bulk cargo, tourism and fishing vessel activities operations. 
One thing that should be mentioned is that fishing vessels have been excluded from 
the scope of ships for application according to the new draft of the mandatory Polar 
Code. Leaving aside the importance of the Polar Code for fishing vessels, the 
historical accidents and traffic records of fishing vessels are quite useful for the 
hazard identification stage and should be carefully collected and analyzed.  
The ArcticData portal can also provide data relating to marine accidents and 
incidents for 2008 and 2009 with Excel form. The information includes the following 
information from 1995 to 2004 for further analysis: 
l Source of Information 
l Categories of ships  
l Date and position of accident happened,  
l Related Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) and EEZ,  
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l Lives lost and total fatalities 
l Fuel spill with amount spilled  
l Total loss, actual/constructive loss and ice damage 
l Primary reason and description 
According to the statistics in 2009, there were 294 accidents and incidents recorded 
by different countries. Figure 11 shows the summary of statistics within the AMSA 
report 2009. 
Vessel Type Number 
Bulk carrier 37 
Container ship 8 
Fishing vessel 108 
General cargo ship 72 
Governmental vessels 11 
Oil/Gas Service & Supply 1 
Passenger ship 27 
Pleasure Craft 0 
Tanker ship 12 
Tug/Barge 15 
Unknown 2 
 
Primary Reason Number 
Collision 22 
Damage to Vessel 54 
Fire/Explosion 25 
Grounded  68 
Machinery Damage/Failure 71 
Sunk/Submerged 43 
Miscellaneous 10 
 
Table 6. Accidents and Incidents in the Arctic, 1995-2004 
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A study of tiered risk assessment based on ArcticData provided by the International 
Association of Antarctica Tour Operation (IAATO) was submitted to IMO in 2011.  
However, the scope of the study was narrowed to focus on passenger ships 
navigating in Polar waters as defined by IMO Guidelines of polar waters. Figure 12 
and Figure 13 show the development of the statistics based on ArcticData by 
IAATO.   
 
 
Figure 8: Overview of casualty data for the Arctic – breakdown of incident/accidents 
per category 
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Figure 9: Overview of casualty data for the Arctic – breakdown of incidents per year 
(year round operations) 
 
The number of passenger vessels illustrated in the diagrams is quite small when  the 
IMO geographical definition of arctic water is adopted. Compared to the total 
number of 4,475 individual vessels including 277 passenger vessels listed in 
ArcticData, the number of the sample is too small to be reliable and convincing. 
Therefore, some consequences based on these statistics as well as the final 
conclusion may not be directly adopted in the further assessment. As the author 
mentioned in the last section, a larger navigable area with similar geographical 
features could be included in the preparatory stage and hazard identification stage.  
 
4.2.3. Limitations of utilizing historical data in preparatory work of FSA 
studies 
During the preparatory stage of FSA studies, regarding historical data analysis, the 
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major limitations can be discussed in two aspects. One is the limitation of the 
database itself, and the other one is the limitation of the future application.  
The limitation of the database depends on those key elements such as database 
structure, geographical scope, vessel categories and accident categories. Generally 
speaking, only accidents with consequences that could be checked are recorded. 
However, there could be a large amount of “near miss” accidents without any 
recording. Actually, these “near miss” cases or warnings are critical to the first 
hazard identification step. Therefore, the underreporting issue is always mentioned in 
the limitations of FSA study. For water areas like the Arctic and Antarctic with small 
vessel samples, the limitation of the database may totally change the final results of 
the study. The analysis of historical data should be consulted more scientifically and 
carefully.  
As to the limitation of the future application, the proactive approach of FSA studies 
has to be emphasized here. Studies only derived from historical data may not help to 
develop proactive regulations. The brainstorming of experts during the preparatory 
stage is strongly recommended in order to maximally mitigate the limitation. The 
combination of historical data and expert opinion could provide a more solid 
foundation for further FSA studies.  
4.3. Discussion of the priority for FSA studies for ships navigating in Polar 
waters 
The purpose of developing a mandatory Polar Code is to provide strong safety and 
environmental provisions for the shipping industry and IMO member nations, who 
are interested in future polar navigation. FSA study is still the method recommended 
by IMO for the rule-making process. However, a full and comprehensive FSA study 
takes a comparatively longer time. Some former FSA studies took more than one 
year to complete. The development of the Polar Code has taken several years and it 
should be completed according to the schedule and to be implemented in those areas 
as soon as possible. Therefore, the priority fields of study become quite important at 
the preparatory stage. The major considerations of this will be discussed according to 
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the differences between the two polar waters and between safety risk and 
environmental risk.  
4.3.1. Arctic waters vs. Antarctic waters 
The analysis of historical traffic and accident data is aimed at developing a 
comprehensive representation of current and future traffic conditions in the polar 
waters. Compared to the Antarctic, vessel traffic especially cruise ships in the Arctic 
waters is increasing more rapidly because of the disappearance of large amounts of 
sea ice, in summer time especially. According to a 2009 AMSA report, the number 
of cruise ship passengers had more than doubled. Moreover, the number of cruise 
ships will continuously increase, considering the growth of the economies of the 
circumpolar nations due to tourism. Besides cruise ships, more shipping lines and 
cargo owners interested in transit Arctic routes are preparing to take the newly 
opened shipping lane in Arctic waters. As a result, more ship accidents and incidents 
will happen in Arctic water in the forthcoming years.  
Regarding the environmental protection aspect, although both Arctic and Antarctic 
waters have the same ecological features and vulnerabilities, the condition of 
Antarctic waters is much better than Arctic waters. As mentioned before, the waters 
south of 60 degrees south latitude have been designated as Antarctic special Area 
under MARPOL 73/78 Annex I, Annex II and Annex V with stricter requirements 
and also the use and carriage of heavy fuel oils is prohibited in Antarctic waters 
according to a new amendment to Annex I of MARPOL. However, the Arctic waters 
have not been included in the list of special areas. 
Furthermore, the Antarctic governance is a good example of regional cooperation 
based on the Antarctic treaty with several agreements. The Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty is a powerful tool for protection of 
the Antarctic waters. As to the Arctic waters, for the time being, there is still no 
equivalent powerful legal regime to govern this area.  
Therefore, the mandatory Polar Code, once enforced, will become the most 
important rule for polar navigation, especially for Arctic water. The provisions for 
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environmental protection will, to some extent, fill the gap of sustainable 
development between the two polar waters.  
 
4.3.2. The navigation safety risk vs. environmental risk 
As a full FSA study, both navigation safety issues and environmental protection 
issues shall be considered in every step of FSA. However, the scope of most of the 
FSA studies until now has been narrowed to navigation safety of ship and personnel 
in order to facilitate the approach to the assessment.    
Moreover, the environmental issues are usually not included in the study because 
some kinds of ships do not present extraordinary hazards to the environment through 
the investigation of historical data. However, considering the environmental 
vulnerability of both polar waters, the risk of ship-borne oil spill could be quite 
significant and irreversible.  
Moreover, IMO is still constantly working with member states and other 
organizations to protect the marine environment from damage caused by ships, 
especially oil spills by ships. A cost-benefit assessment (CBA) based on 
environmental risk assessment has been carried out in the FSA FOR Crude oil tanker 
SAFEDOR project. The recommendation relating to CBA aroused a lot of discussion 
between countries and organizations, especially for the newly adopted CAT model 
and related environmental risk evaluation criteria (EREC). As a result, a 
correspondence group was established to develop an EREC and review of the 
environmental part of this FSA. Moreover, as mentioned before, the correspondence 
group even recommended developing IMO Guidelines for the environmental FSA. It 
shows that the environmental risk assessment is now a greater concerned to the 
international community and the gap between navigation safety and environmental 
safety is going to be filled owing to technological improvements and broader 
international discussion and cooperation.  
Referring to the historical data provided in Table 6 from AMSA 2009, it can be seen 
that grounding is one of the most common accidents in Polar waters and one of the 
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major contributors to oil spills. The environmental risk of grounding has to be 
assessed in order to make appropriate provisions accordingly.  
Therefore, the author recommends, during the preparatory stage of FSA for the 
mandatory Polar Code, the environmental FSA shall be considered as important as 
the safety FSA. Regarding the progress of development of the Code, an 
environmental FSA for the working group of IMO could be more urgent and useful 
to the working group of IMO. The comments and discussion aroused by 
environmental FSA could also provide important sources for future amendments to 
the Code.  
  
4.4. Summary  
The preparatory step of the FSA is quite important and linkage between the 
preparatory step to other following steps is also strong, especially the hazard 
identification step. The FSA studies of the mandatory Polar Code should be carried 
out for the rule-making process (if time is sufficient) or as soon as possible after the 
adoption of the Code for further amendment. A full FSA study considering both 
safety and environmental protection for the whole polar waters is definitely helpful; 
however it is also more complicated and time-consuming. 
Therefore, the author suggests that the scope of study shall be narrowed to focus on 
more urgent requirements from the international community and other areas of 
concern could be completed based on this study.  
Considering all related matters mentioned in this Chapter, the author thinks the most 
important FSA study for the Code should be the environmental FSA for the Arctic 
waters. Cruise ships or bulk carriers can be the categories of ships involved at the 
first stage and the main accident category shall be focused on the grounding of 
vessels.  
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5. Challenges of the Application of FSA for the mandatory polar code 
5.1. Potential hazard identification and analysis 
5.1.1. IMO HAZID workshops for Polar Code 
As a risk-based Polar Code, the structure and outcome of the Code have to be 
consistent with a risk assessment. It is necessary to gather all stakeholders of the 
Code to discuss all the possible risks for the early adoption of the Code.  
According to the report of the HAZID workshop (DE 53/18/5, 2009) submitted by 
Denmark concerning human life of Arctic waters, a risk matrix (Figure 10) was 
developed during the meeting in accordance with the Guidelines of FSA. The high, 
medium and low risk of navigation in arctic waters was ranked through the 
discussion during the meeting, which recommended being a basis for the further 
development of the Polar Code.  
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  Figure 10: Risk Matrix for ships operating in Arctic waters (source DE 53/18/5) 
Therefore, in order to encourage the development of environment aspects of the 
Polar Code, the work of the Polar Code Hazard Identification workshop has already 
been carried out coordinated by NDV in 2011. Comparing with the HAZID of 
human life, the difficulties of environmental HAZID are the lack of data and 
information on the impact of environmental hazards as there is relatively lower 
vessel traffic density than any other sea area. Therefore, the analysis of the historical 
accident data can provide limited contributions for the HAZID process. The integrity 
of the potential hazard list as well as the further risk matrix with ranking of hazards 
mostly depends on discussion and brainstorming between experts.  
According to the report of HAZID workshop 2011, a draft hazard matrix (see Annex 
I) has already been developed, which can be quite useful for further discussion. 
However, the outcome of the workshop is not quite satisfactory because of the 
limited time of discussion. The full hazard list relating to the impacts of the 
environment as well as the corresponding control options was not completed by 
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experts. Moreover, the work of ranking listed hazards was not covered in this 
workshop. Therefore, a lot of work still needs to be done for hazard identification, 
especially the determination of the priority of risks.   
 
5.1.2. Ranking of risk scenarios 
Although the workshop on the Polar Code in 2011 did not provide a complete 
HAZID for further environmental FSA studies, this workshop has already provided a 
good direction for the future HAZID work. According to the report, the release 
assessment has been considered as an important step of HAZID. The environmental 
impacts of ships’ activities are divided into possible routine releases into the 
environment and possible accidental releases into the environment with a detail 
description list (see Annex II) of release categories. Moreover, the contributing 
factors and some related risk control measures are also listed in the report. Taking 
these factors into consideration, a more useful qualitative or quantitative risk analysis 
could be constructed accordingly.  
A qualitative assessment can be adopted according to the release scenario. A group 
of experts could be organized regarding the assessment requirements and work 
together on the ranking process. The probability of routine release and accidental 
release as well as the severity of consequences can be discussed and completed 
during the meeting of experts. Meanwhile, the related control options could be listed 
for step 3 risk control options. 
 
5.1.3. Challenges of HAZID for Polar Code 
As mentioned above, the first challenges of HAZID for the Polar Code is the 
completeness of the hazard list. As a basis of all further assessments, all potential 
risks should be identified in this stage. Considering the drafting hazard list provided 
by IMO, some important potential hazards such as introduction of alien species and 
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underwater noises (DE 56/INF 3) have still not been included or discussed. More 
systematic analysis should be carried out by work groups by adopting the methods 
recommended in FSA Guidelines such as HAZOP and FMEA in order to identify all 
environmental hazards as well as initial events.  
Another big challenge for the HAZID process is the ranking of risks as there is no 
specific risk matrix recommended by IMO for the environmental FSA study. Until 
now, the discussion within the IMO has only covered oil spills as a consequence of 
accidents. However, the discussion of the oil spill could be a preparatory work for 
further improvement of the generic environmental risk assessment.  
Regarding the report of the correspondence group for environmental risk evaluation 
criteria, the frequency index (FI) has been proposed by the working group for use in 
the safety FSA methodology (MEPC 60/22). However, the severity index (SI) is still 
under discussion as related environmental risk evaluation criteria for the quantitative 
assessment has not been agreed upon.  
However, concerning the ranking of hazards for the development of the Polar Code, 
there may not be enough time to wait for the organization to provided generic 
reference criteria. The better way to carry out the job within a limited time might be 
to accept the SI decided by the experts based on the IMO SI table. The types, 
amounts and timings of the release of hazards (Fairman, 1999) could also be 
considered in order to make the SI more appropriate for the environmental 
assessment. Once the related criteria are approved by IMO, it could be adopted in the 
future amendment process for the Polar Code.   
 
5.2. Measures for Risk assessment 
The second step of FSA is the detailed assessments of the causes and initial events 
and consequences of those release scenarios identified in step one (MSC 91/16).  
Compared to qualitative assessment by experts, a quantitative method is much more 
complicated and takes more time to finish. However, it is a more systematic way to 
identify and rank the hazards compared to the limited knowledge of experts. The 
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quantitative method to estimate the probability of all potential data can be carried out 
through different ways. For example, the historical data could be used for 
investigation. As the database for Polar waters is comparatively small, the outcome 
of the assessment could be not reliable. Moreover, the quantitative method could 
only be carried out according to the implicit environmental risk evaluation criteria 
approved by IMO. As mentioned before, these generic criteria have not been 
discussed while the specific criteria for oil spills are under development.  
Another method that could be adopted here is the simulation of scenarios. After 
listing the contributory factors and causes of routine and accidental scenarios, the 
probability of release could be concluded on the basis of the statistics collected 
during and after the simulation process. Those historical data in polar waters as well 
as in other sea areas could be used to verify the results. As to the quantitative method 
of determining the severity of the consequences of the risk scenarios, various 
methods of ecological impact assessment could be adopted and the related 
consequences of risk scenarios can be estimated by those methods such as Predicted 
No Effect Concentration (PNEC) and fuzzy logic. However, the accuracy of the 
consequences assessment of a ship’s release based on an ecological impact 
assessment with related assessment criteria has to be further considered by the 
experts.  
Compared to the quantitative method, qualitative assessment is easier and timesaving. 
According to FSA Guidelines, the use of techniques like Dalphi for expert judgment 
could be used, where data is unavailable (page 11, MSC 91/16).    
 
5.3. Risk Control Options 
The step of risk control options aims at identifying all the risk control measures 
(RCM) for the identified risks with new methods of operation or management and 
providing a combination of RCM for further cost benefit assessment. According to 
the report of a work shop in 2011, the following RCO has been listed: 
• Ice strengthening for ships. 
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• Ice forecasts. 
• Availability of ice breakers. 
• Navigation aids that fully function in polar waters. 
• Equipment and systems that function correctly, and on demand, in extreme 
cold. 
• Additives for fuel to prevent waxing (prevent failure or failure on demand). 
• Restricted bunker fuel oil type(s). 
• Stricter routine discharge limits compared to IMO baseline (MARPOL). 
• Enforcement of discharge limits. 
 
The RCO is based on the risk levels of hazards provided by the first step. The 
limitations of step one will strongly affect the result of the RCO. One of the 
limitations of step one that has to be mentioned is the conclusion based on expert 
opinion.  According to the discussion in the last two sections, the better way or 
more timesaving way to carry out the HAZID and risk assessment strongly relies on 
the decisions made by experts. What’s more, the RCO step also relies on expert 
opinion (Knotavas, 2009). Compared with finding RCO from historical data, the 
reasonable estimation of risk reduction could be more proactive and helpful to find 
new operation and management measures. Therefore, these two important steps, 
even step two for re-evaluation, are all decided by experts. The experts become quite 
a vulnerable chain of the assessment.  
Taking advantage of reliable techniques for experts as mentioned could be an option 
to solve the problem. However, the calculation of concordance coefficient, as 
proposed by FSA Guidelines, provides a technical way to judge the degree of 
agreement between experts. After calculation of concordance coefficient by formula, 
the level of agreement will be described as: 
W > 0.7 Good agreement 
W 0.5 – 0.7 Medium agreement 
 
W 
 
 
< 0.5 
 
Poor agreement 
 
Table 7:  Concordance coefficient (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12) 
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The decision made by experts with a concordance coefficient could be adopted and 
the result could be regarded as a reference for the next linking steps as well the final 
decision-making step. 
 
5.4. Cost benefit assessments 
The cost-benefit assessment is an important step and it has been completed with 
quantitative methods. The cost and benefit of the RCOs obtained from step 3 shall be 
carefully calculated by proper methods and techniques. The biggest challenges of 
this step must be the calculation of indices for the cost-effectiveness as the 
environmental risk evaluation criteria has not yet been decided.  
However, the risk evaluation criteria of oil release have been discussed within IMO 
after the adoption of the criterion of CATS within the SAFEDOR report. In this repot, 
the threshold value of $60,000/tonne aroused debate at IMO, as it is a critical issue 
for the future decision-making process. As a result, a decision was made by MEPC 
62 to establish a working group on environmental risk evaluation criteria to finalize 
step 4 based on the CATS model (MEPC 62/24). This means there will be a criteria 
proposed by IMO soon.  
Compared with the complexity of the cost benefit assessment of oil spills, the 
comprehensive assessment involved in environmental FSA for the Polar Code will 
be more complicated. The discussion of generic environmental criteria has not been 
put on the table yet. However, the specific model could be adopted if the scope of 
study was narrowed into specific accident categories, for example the accidents of 
grounding. As one of the primary causes of accidents in polar waters as well as one 
of the major contributors to oil spills, the CATS model could be adopted for the 
cost-benefit assessment and related criteria recommended could also be used for the 
determination of SI of the HAZID period and the decision making period. The full 
environmental FSA could be carried out after adoption of the generic criteria for 
amendments of the related regulations in the future.  
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5.5. Recommendations for decision making 
According to the flow chart of FSA methodology (Figure 11), the final step of 
recommendations for decision-making is directly and indirectly based on all other 
previous steps.  
 
 
Figure 11: Flow chart of FSA methodology (MSC 91/16) 
 
The RCOs recommended by step 4 shall reduce the risks to a level “as low as 
reasonably practical” and to be “cost effective”. Subsequently, the suggestion for 
rule improvement or amendment shall be carried out accordingly. Moreover, the list 
of recommended RCOs with the application of RCOs shall be listed.  
For environmental FSA, the difficult part of this step is how to find an ALARP 
region with appropriate risk acceptance criteria. However, both individual and 
societal risks adopted in former FSA studies are based on crew fatalities or passenger 
fatalities, which is not the major concern of environmental protection. The 
acceptance criteria for assessing damage to the environment could be established by 
adopting the extent of environmental damage to replace the extent of personal injury. 
Both quantitative method and qualitative method can be used to establish the 
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environmental criteria. Compared to quantitative risk acceptance criteria with 
explicit numbers, the qualitative criteria including environmental damage in defined 
by seriousness classes (Nijs, 2009) could be simpler and more appropriate. The risk 
acceptance matrix for society risks established in France (see Figure 12) is an 
example of this.  
 
Figure 12: (Nijs, 2009) Risk Acceptance Matrix for Society Risks 
 
The red fields represent an unacceptable risk and the yellow fields show where the 
new plant can be approved, on condition that all ALARA safety measures are 
implemented. The seriousness of the hazard and the frequency could be decided by 
the expert group. Considering the specific nature of polar waters, the seriousness 
degree of environmental damage will be comparatively higher than other sea areas. 
The environmental acceptance criteria, which have been established by other 
countries regarding local waters or rivers, can also be used to verify the final results.  
 
5.6. Summary 
The major challenges of the environmental FSA for the polar code are the lack of 
generic environmental risk evaluation criteria, which makes the qualitative method a 
better choice for early stages of study. However, the progress of the working group 
involving the environmental risk evaluation criteria for oil spills is satisfactory owing 
63	  
to the support from member states and related organizations. After appropriate 
definition of the scope of study, the environmental FSA with qualitative assessments 
could be carried out based on the current available criteria and the future generic 
criteria could be adopted for a full and more comprehensive FSA for further 
amendments.  
As to the experts, the decision relying on judgment of experts cannot be avoided in 
every step of FSA. A more technical method such as Delphi as well as the 
calculation of concordance coefficient can be adopted to improve and check the 
results of experts. Moreover, the qualification of the experts with requirements has 
been regulated in the FSA Guidelines (page 70, MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12) in order to 
ensure the reliability of the expert decision.  
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6. Conclusion and recommendations for the future works 
6.1. Conclusion  
With climate change and other activities of human beings already placing pressure 
on the polar region, additional marine activities are inevitably increasing the burden 
of the vulnerable ecosystems of Polar Regions. However, the increase in areas 
without ice-coverage in Arctic waters has aroused more interest from the maritime 
industry to open new shipping routes. The number of vessels taking advantage of the 
trans-Arctic routes almost doubled this year, which shows the growth tendency of 
future vessel traffic. As a result, risks such as oil spill, illegal release and 
introduction of invasive species are increasing rapidly. Therefore, the development 
of a mandatory Polar Code is quite important in order to protect the last pristine land 
for human beings. 
Considering the development of the Polar Code in IMO, from the proposal for 
guidelines first submitted in 1996 to the recommendatory guidelines for Arctic 
ice-covered areas approved by IMO in 2002, it has taken almost seven years to finish 
the job. It has taken another seven years for the organization to develop guidelines 
for ships operating in the polar waters, from 2002 to 2009. During this period, more 
accidents happened in these areas, arousing the concerns of countries and 
organization to provide more specific regulations both mandatory and 
recommendatory for the polar waters. Therefore, the mandatory Polar Code has 
become one of the most important tasks of the DE sub-committee.  
However, compared to the recommendatory guidelines, the development of a 
mandatory Polar Code is more complicated and time-consuming. At the early stage, 
the member groups have approved the major structure of the Code, which provides 
functional requirements supported by prescriptive provisions with both mandatory 
and recommendatory parts by risk based approach. Nowadays, the discussion of the 
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mandatory Polar Code in IMO is now moving from some basic principles such as 
main structure, scope of ship categories and definition of geographic coverage to 
more detailed functional requirements and regulations. Recently, proposals for a 
specific environmental protection chapter have been approved and listed as chapter 
15 in the draft for further discussion. Therefore, how to make appropriate regulations 
to reduce environmental damage in polar waters is widely discussed among member 
states and organizations. All kinds of suggestion and recommendations from 
different stakeholders submitted to IMO makes the decision-making process more 
and more complicated and difficult. The formal safety assessment, as a risk-based 
tool recommended by IMO, can proactively provide useful and practical suggestions 
for the final decision-making process and speed-up the progress of approval and 
implementation of the Code.  
Considering the development of FSA, a lot of studies and achievements before2006 
were focused on safety issues. During that time, the first official version of FSA 
guidelines was approved in 2002 and the amendments for FSA guidelines were 
adopted in 2006. The benchmark for environment issues shall be the submission of a 
series of FSA studies included in the EU SAFEDOR project. The special 
environmental concerns about oil spills from reports of crude oil tankers aroused 
wide debates and discussions in IMO. A significant breakthrough on the study of 
environmental risk evaluation assessment has been achieved by the designated 
correspondence group. Therefore, the author thinks the environmental FSA with 
appropriate criteria could be quite useful for the development of an environmental 
protection chapter of the mandatory Polar Code. 
In order to facilitate the progress of the FSA, the scope of area concerned has to be 
narrowed and carefully defined beforehand. The historical data was analyzed by the 
author in order to decide the priority area to be considered. Moreover, the further 
investigation into differences between the two polar waters and the essentialities 
between environmental issues and safety issues for the current drafting stage of the 
Code provides more useful information for the preparatory work. According to the 
outcome of these analyses, the author recommends carrying out an environmental 
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FSA for Arctic waters for bulk carriers or passenger ships concerning specific 
accident categories like grounding or collision.   
After investigation into of each step of environmental FSA, the challenges of each 
step were analyzed and discussed and possible methods to solve the problems were 
also provided by the author. The lack of generic environmental risk evaluation 
criteria is a key contributor to the failure of adopting a quantitative method. 
Therefore, the qualitative method is a better choice at early stages of study. What’s 
more, special attention should be paid to the qualification of experts, as it is a critical 
factor for the whole process.  Furthermore, another option was provided by the 
author considering the current specific criteria for oil spills provided by the working 
group. The quantitative method can be achieved by narrowing the scope of ship 
release to oil spills only. This might be a more systematic and comprehensive 
method that can verify the results obtained by a qualitative approach.  
 
6.2. Recommendations for future studies 
As far as the challenges and possible solutions are concluded, the author would like 
to make the following recommendations for future works to IMO, interested 
international organizations and states: 
l A correspondence group for environmental FSA should be established to 
improve future studies. The improvement of mandatory Polar Code is one of the 
major tasks need to be accomplished currently.  
l IMO should encourage the DE sub-Committee to further investigate the 
environmental protection part of the Code in order to identify those factors of 
inappropriate and out of concern in order to support the environmental FSA 
study.  
l Classification societies such as DNV and GL should continue to work on the 
environmental FSA study for improving the future ship design standard of 
environmental protection for those ships operating in polar waters.  
l A workshop for polar code HAZID should be held again to complete the list of 
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potential hazards and risk matrix for risk assessment.  
l Member states, especially circum-arctic countries and member states of the 
Antarctic treaty should further improve vessel traffic monitoring and accidents 
database for polar waters in order to provide more reliable statistics for further 
investigation.  
l Those member states, especially circum-arctic countries should also organize the 
environmental FSA studies in order to improve the local environmental 
regulations relating to polar waters.  
l Those related international organizations such as IAATO and Clean shipping 
Coalition (CSC), which have experts in different areas such as ecology, biology 
and ship design, should continue to work together with IMO to improve the 
environmental protection part of the Code. Those experts should also be 
encouraged to be involved in all stages of the environmental FSA in the future.  
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APPENDIX A 
Polar Code – Hazards Matrix previously prepared by IMO Work Group 
(sources: Polar Code HARZID Workshop Report , 2011) 
Conditions/Areas	  of	  concern	   	   Table	  1	  of	  4	  Environmental	   	   Conditions	  
	  
Potential	  
Hazards	  
Possible	  consequences	   Intermediate	  Result	   Potential	  Result	  
1.1	   Low	   air	  temp	  	  	  
1.1.1	   Loss	   of	   material	  performance	   1.1.1.1Side	  shell	  rupture	   Water	   ingress	   –	   capsize	   –	  sinking	  –	  pollution	  	   1.1.1.2	  Side	  shell	  fitting	  failure	   Flooding	   –	   machinery	  damage	  –	  capsize	  	   1.1.1.3	  Rupture	  of	  deck	  piping	   Pollution	  	   	   System	  failure	  e.g.	  fire	  main	  1.1.2	  Machinery	  [equipment]	  malfunction	   1.1.2.1	  Reduced	  maneuverability	   	  	   1.1.2.1.1.	   Grounding,	  stranding,	  trapped	  in	  ice	  	   	   1.1.2.a	  Battery	  fails	  to	  start	  unit	   Emergency	  equip	  non-­‐start	   Evacuation	  problems	  	   	   1.1.2.b	   Electric	   contacts	  malfunction	   Remote	   control	   failure,	   false	  alarms	   Various	  	   	   1.1.2.c	   Loss	   of	   working	  clearance	  -­‐	  seizure	   Fire	   flaps	  won’t	  close;	  cargo	  vents	  freeze	   Fire	   uncontrollable;	   cargo	  over-­‐pressure	  	   	   1.1.2.d	   Loss	   of	   lubricant	  performance	  (high	  viscosity)	   Rotating	   equipment	   starting	  problems	   Emergency	   fire	   pump	  won’t	  start	  Emergency	   Generator	   won’t	  start	  	   	   1.1.2.e	   Moisture	   freezes	   –	  mechanical	  seizure	   Fire	   flap	   won’t	   close;	   cargo	   vents	  freeze;	  winch	  brakes	  fail	   Fire	   uncontrollable;	   cargo	  over-­‐pressure;	  can’t	  let	  go	  or	  retrieve	   anchor;	   mooring	  difficulties;	   assistance	  difficulties	  1.1.3	  Freezing	  of	  fluid/cargo	  	   1.1.1.1	  Side	  shell	  rupture	  1.1.3.1	  Cargo	  damage	  1.1.3.2	  Can’t	  discharge	  cargo	  1.1.3.3	   Cargo	   expands/contracts	   –	  structural	  damage	  
Water	   ingress	   –	   capsize	   -­‐	  sinking	  	  	  1.1.3.3	  Pollution	  1.1.4	   .1	   Increased	   fluid	  viscosity	   –	   machinery	   –	  diesel	  engine	   1.1.4.1	  Fuel	  pumping	  difficulties	   1.1.4.1.1	   Loss	   of	   electrical	  and/or	  propulsive	  power	  1.1.4.2	   Increased	   fluid	  viscosity	   –	   machinery	   -­‐	  hydraulic	   1.1.4.2	   Hydraulic	   deck	   equipment	  performance	   1.1.4.2.1	   Anchor	   and	  mooring	   line	   handling	  problems	  1.1.4.3	   Increased	   fluid	  viscosity	  -­‐	  cargo	   1.1.4.2	  Cargo	  pumping	  difficulties	   1.1.4.3.1Can’t	   lighten	  ship	   in	  emergency	  1.1.5	   	   Effect	  of	  cold	  cargo	  on	  hull	  materials	   1.1.1.1.1;	  1.1.1.2	   Pollution	  1.1.6	   	   Loss	   of	   functionality	  of	   operating	   and	   emergency	  equipment	  	  
	   	  
1.1.7	   Loss	   of	   functionality	   of	  doors	  and	  closing	  appliances	   	  	   Can’t	   access	   spaces;	   can’t	   close	  down	   spaces	   to	   prevent	   water	  ingress	  or	  to	  fight	  fire	   	  1.1.8	   Reduced	   survival	   time	  /hypothermia	   	   	  1.1.9	   Reduced	   human	  performance,	   physical	   and	   Various	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Conditions/Areas	  of	  concern	   	   Table	  1	  of	  4	  Environmental	   	   Conditions	  
	   cognitive	  functions	   	  	  1.1.10	   Ice	   on	   deck	   and	  superstructure	   	   	  	   Loss	  of	  stability	  Loss	  of	  footing	   List/capsize	  Personal	  accident,	  death	  	   	   	  	   1.1.12	   	   Limitation	   of	   SAR	  capabilities	   	   	  1.1.13	  Increased	  hotel	  load??	   Electric	  power	  shortage	   	  
1.2	   Low	   water	  temp	  	  
1.2.1	  Reduced	  survival	  time	  	   	   	  1.2.2	   Malfunction	   of	   fluid	  systems	  	   	   	  1.2.3	   Clogging	   of	   inlets	   &	  outlets	   Machinery	  malfunction	   1.1.3.1.1	  1.3	   Extreme	   &	  rapidly	  changing	  weather	   	  
1.3.1	   Difficult	   to	   prepare	   for	  or	   avoid	   dangerous	   weather	  conditions	   	   	  1.3.2	   Propulsion	   and/or	  manoeuvring	  Difficulties	   	   	  
 
Conditions/Areas	  of	  concern	   	   Table	  2	  of	  4	  High	  Latitude	  
	  
Potential	  
Hazards	  
Possible	  consequences	   Intermediate	  Result	   Potential	  Result	  
2.1 Reduced	  navigational	  aids	  	  
2.1.1	   Grounding,	   standing,	  trapped	  in	  ice	   	   	  2.1.2	   Impact	   with	   ice	   or	  other	  structures	   	   2.1.2.1	   Injuries	   or	  fatalities	  2.1.3	   Lack	   of	  signals/disturbance	  DGPS	   	   	  2.1.4	  Unstable	  gyro	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  2.2	   Varying	  availability	   of	  charts/hydrographical	  information	  
2.2.1	  Grounding,	  stranding	  	   	   	  2.2.2	  Voyage	  planning	  	   	   	  2.3.3	   	   Anchoring	   	   	  	   	   	  
2.3	   Varying	  availability	   of	  charts/hydrographical	  information	  
2.3.1	   	   Voyage	  planning	  	   	   	  2.3.2	   	   Difficult	  to	  prepare	  for	   	  or	   avoid	   dangerous	   weather	  conditions/	  situations	  	  
	   	  
2.3.3	   	   Insufficient	   clothing	  and	   supplies	   (optimistic	  planning)	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Conditions/Areas	  of	  concern	   	   Table	  3	  of	  4	   	   Environmental	  Sensitivity	  
	  
Potential	  
Hazards	  
Possible	  consequences	   Intermediate	  Result	   Potential	  Result	  
3.1	   Discharges	  from	   normal	  operation	  
3.1.1	   	   Damage	  on	  ice	  caused	  by	  soot	   	   	   	  3.1.2	  Environmental	  damage	  from	  grey	  water	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  3.2	   Oil	   and	   3.2.1.	   	   Inability	   to	   operate	   pollution	   response	   	   	  
2.4	   Variable	  infrastructure	  
2.4.1	   	   	   Insufficient	  actions	  to	  incidents	  and	  accident	   	   2.4.1.1.	   Potential	   for	  incidences	   to	  escalate	  	  2.4.2	   	   	   Insufficient	   spill	  preparedness	   	   	   	  2.4.3	   	   	   Limited	   compliance	  and	   enforcement	   (local	   	  infrastructure,	   	   waste	  reception	  facilitations)	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	   	   	  
2.5	   Interference	  with	   long	   range	  electronic	  communications	  
2.5.1	   	   	   loss	   of	   possibility	   to	  send	   distress	  messages/contact	  SAR	   	  	  
	   	  
2.5.2	   	   	   	   No	   weather/ice	  forecast	   	   	   	  2.5.3	   	   	   	   Loss	   of	  communication	  possibilities	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  2.6	   Variable	  [local]	  communication	  capabilities	  
2.6.1	   	   Communication	  difficulties	   	   	  	   	   	  
2.7	   Limited	  search	   and	  rescue	  capabilities	  
2.7.1	   	   	   Insufficient	   response	  to	  incidents	  and	  accidents	   	   	  2.7.2	   	   	   Lack	   of	   medical	  support	   	   	  2.7.3	  Capability	  of	  emergency	  source	  of	  electrical	  power.	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  
2.8	   Limited	  availability	  of	  oil	  spill	  preparedness	  
2.8.1	   Insufficient	   response	   to	  spills	  	   	   2.8.1.1	   Potential	   for	  incidences	   to	  escalate	  2.8.2	   	   Damage	   to	   ecological	  systems	   	   	  2.8.3	   	   Damage	   to	   flora	   and	  fauna	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Conditions/Areas	  of	  concern	   	   Table	  3	  of	  4	   	   Environmental	  Sensitivity	  
	  chemical	  spill	   systems	  due	  to	  surrounding	  ice	  Note	  3.2.1	  is	  not	  a	  consequence	  -­‐	  it’s	  a	  hazard???	   	   	  	   	   	  3.3	  Air	  Pollution	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  
Conditions/Areas	  of	  concern	   	   Table	  4	  of	  4	   	   Human	  Element	  
	  
Potential	  
Hazards	  
Possible	  consequences	   Intermediate	  Result	   Potential	  Result	  
4.1	   Lack	   of	  knowledge	   of	  personal	  protection	   	  	  
4.1.1	  Frostbite	   	   	  4.1.2	  Hypothermia	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  4.2	  Unfamiliarity	  of	   polar	  environment	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  4.3	   Working	  environment	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APPENDIX B 
Checklist for HAZID provided by IMO working group 
(sources: Polar Code HARZID Workshop Report , 2011) 
 
Possible Routine Releases into the Environment 
• Combustion gases from main power plant (e.g. oxides of nitrogen, oxides of 
sulphur, oxides of carbon, unburnt and partially burnt hydrocarbons, soot, ash, 
etc.). 
• Combustion gases from ancillary plant, such as incinerators (dioxins, poly 
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)), inert gas generators, etc.. 
• Fugitive Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) from cargo and fuel tanks. 
• Liquid waste from accommodation blocks (dirty water, sewage, etc.). 
• Food waste and other solid waste from accommodation blocks. 
• Liquid waste from bilge. 
• Ballast water exchange. 
• Greases or lubricants, for example from main propulsion or steering systems. 
• Anti-fouling paints from ship hulls. 
 
 
Possible Accidental Releases into the Environment 
• Cargo from damaged cargo tanks or compartments. 
• Cargo containers that have fallen overboard. 
• Bunker fuel oil from fuel oil tanks. 
 
 
Contributing Factors 
• Ice bergs as collision hazard. 
• Ice bergs as ship crush hazard (structural failure). 
• Ice on ship superstructure (loss of stability, foundering). 
• Extreme cold leading to brittleness of metal (structural failure). 
• Extreme cold or icing leading to technical failure of equipment, including 
emergency or backup equipment that might fail on demand due to extreme 
cold or icing. 
• Poor communications. 
• Long response times and limited response capability. 
• Weak or non-existent conventional navigational aids (lights, distinguishable 
features for bearings, etc.)? 
• Poor charts? 
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Other issues to be considered? 
• High latitude effects on navigation systems (lack of GPS, cosmic radiation 
effects)? 
• Variations of magnetic north/ south? 
• Long days or long nights resulting in interrupted sleep patterns, loss of 
alertness, poor decision making? 
• Weak primary radar returns from icy shorelines? 
• Difficulty of distinguishing sea ice from wave clutter with primary radar?  
• Effect of cold water on spilled materials? 
• Extremely low visibility or low visibility for long periods of time? 
• Extreme sea state (wave height)? 
• Extreme wind speed? 
• Extreme brightness due to low sun, 24 hours per day? 
• Seismic (volcano, earthquake) effects? 
 
 
Risk Control Measures and Risk Control Options 
• Ice strengthening for ships. 
• Ice forecasts. 
• Availability of ice breakers. 
• Navigation aids that fully function in polar waters. 
• Equipment and systems that function correctly, and on demand, in extreme 
cold. 
• Additives for fuel to prevent waxing (prevent failure or failure on demand). 
• Restricted bunker fuel oil type(s). 
• Stricter routine discharge limits compared to IMO baseline (MARPOL). 
• Enforcement of discharge limits. 
 
 
